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WHAT IS CORPORATION? 
-- THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY CONTROVERSY AND 









  The law speaks of a corporation as a ‘legal person’ -- as a subject of rights and duties 
capable of owning real property, entering into contracts, and suing and being sued in its own name 
separate and distinct from its shareholders.  For many centuries there have been a heated 
controversy between corporate nominalists and corporate realists as to the ‘essence’ of this 
soulless and bodiless person.  The first purpose of this paper is to end this age-old ‘corporate 
personality controversy’ once and for all.  It is, however, not by declaring victory for one side or 
the other, but by declaring victory for both.  The key to this claim is the observation that an 
incorporated firm is composed of not one but two ownership relations: the shareholders own the 
corporation and the corporation in turn owns the corporate assets.  The corporation thus plays a 
dual role of a ‘person’ and a ‘thing’ in the system of law.  This paper then shows how this 
person/thing duality of corporation is capable of generating two seemingly contradictory corporate 
structures -- one ‘nominalistic’ and the other ‘realistic.’  The second purpose of this paper is to 
reexamine the theory of corporate governance.  The fact that an incorporated firm is characterized 
by two-tier ownership structure implies that corporate managers cannot be regarded as agents of 
shareholders.  They are instead ‘fiduciaries’ of the corporation.  Indeed, this paper advocates the 
return to the pre-Law&Economics orthodoxy, maintaining that the foundation of every corporate 
governance system should be the managers' fiduciary duties to the corporation and that the law 
governing these duties should be essentially mandatory.  It also argues that a variety of corporate 
governance systems across countries is due to the difference in governance mechanisms that 
supplement the costly implementation of fiduciary law by courts.   
 
                                                 
ñçAn earlier version of this paper was presented at ISER XIII Workshop on Law and Economics, held at 
Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, Italy, on June 29
th, 2000.   I am grateful to the workshop participants for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  This paper is based mostly on Iwai (1999).ç0. Introduction. 
  
  What is corporation?   
  The law speaks of a corporation as a 'legal person' -- as a subject of rights and duties capable of 
owning real property, entering into contracts, and suing and being sued in its own name.
1  For 
many centuries, philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists and among all jurists 
and legal scholars have debated heatedly as to what constitutes the 'essence' of this soulless and 
bodiless person.  In this so-called 'corporate personality controversy,' one of the most celebrated 
controversies in legal theory and legal philosophy, two competing legal theories have emerged, 
each advancing diametrically opposed view on the ‘essence’ of the corporation.  They are 
'corporate nominalism’ and 'corporate realism.'
2  The corporate nominalism asserts that the 
corporation is merely a contractual association of shareholders, whose legal personality is no more 
than an abbreviated way of writing their names together.   In opposition, the corporate realism 
claims that the corporation is a full-fledged organizational entity whose legal personality is no 
more than an external expression of its real personality in the society.  And both claim to have 
superseded the 'fiction theory,' the traditional doctrine since the medieval times, which maintained 
that the corporation is a separate and distinct social entity but its legal personality is a mere fiction 
created by the state. 
  The rivalry between corporate nominalism and corporate realism has continued up until now.  
The contractual theory of the firm, be it an agency theory version or a transaction-cost economics 
version, is a direct descendant of the corporate nominalism,
3 whereas the evolutionary theory of 
the firm or the knowledge-base view of the firm can be interpreted as a modern reincarnation of 
the corporate realism.
4  The former regards corporate firms as “simply legal fiction which serve as 
                                                 
1 Sec. 3.02 of the American Bar Association’s Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) states 
that ‘unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation ... has the same power as an 
individual to do things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without 
limitation power: (1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate name;...(4) to purchase, 
receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal 
property, or any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; (5) to sell, convey, mortgage, 
pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property;....’ 
2 There is a huge body of writings on this controversy.  Some of the best-known works available in English 
are Savigny (1884), Maitland (1900), Machen (1911), Dewey (1926), Radin (1932), Wolff (1938),  Hart 
(1954), Hessen, (1979), Dan-Cohen (1986), and Teubner (1988).  For a comprehensive review of various 
theories of corporate personality (before 1930), see Hallis (1930). 
3 See, for instance, Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook 
and Fischel (1991), and Williamson (1985). 
4 See, for instance, Penrose (1959), Nelson and Winter (1982), Teece (1982), Pelikan (1989); Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990), and Chandler (1992). a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individuals,”
5 whereas the latter posits corporate 
firms as “organizations that know how to do things, ... while individual members come and go.”
6  
The corporate personality controversy is far from a relic of the past.   
    The present paper is an attempt to ‘end’ this age-old opposition between nominalism and 
realism once and for all.  It is, however, not by declaring victory for one side or the other.  It is by 
declaring victory for both.  The key to this claim is an observation that, in contrast to a sole-
proprietorship firm or a partnership firm, a corporate firm consists of not one but two ownership 
relations: the shareholders own the corporation as a legal thing and the corporation as a legal 
person in turn owns the corporate assets.  The corporation thus plays a dual role of a ‘person’ and 
a ‘thing’ in the system of law.  It is, I believe, this person/thing duality that is responsible for the 
long persistence of the controversy on corporate personality.  Indeed, the first objective of the 
present paper is to demonstrate how this person/thing duality of the corporation is capable of 
generating two seemingly contradictory corporate structures -- one approximating corporate 
realism and the other approximating corporate nominalism. 
  The law is thus unable to determine the nature of the corporation even within its own system.  
This does not, however, imply the impossibility of a single principle unifying a variety of 
corporate governance systems that have evolved in different countries.  The problems of 
‘corporate’ governance are literally the problems of governing the ‘corporate’ form of business 
firms, in distinction to sole-proprietorship firms or partnership firms.  Indeed, the fact that an 
incorporated firm is characterized by two-tier ownership structure implies that corporate managers 
cannot be regarded as agents of shareholders; they are the ‘fiduciaries’ of the corporation.  The 
second purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that at the foundation of every corporate 
governance system lie the managers’ fiduciary duties to the corporation, and that the legal rules 
regulating these duties should be essentially mandatory.  This paper also argues that a wide 
variation of corporate governance systems across countries is due to a wide difference in 
governance mechanisms that supplement the costly implementation of fiduciary law by courts.  
 
1. Persons, Things and Corporations 
 
 
                                                 
5 Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 310.  
6 Winter (1988), p. 176.    
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Fig. 1: A Person and Things 
  In the basic model of the market economy, expounded in any introductory textbook of 
economics, the relationship between persons and things is simple and clear.  As is illustrated in 
Fig. 1, persons are subjects of property right, and things are objects of property right.  Persons own 
things, and things are owned by persons.  There is an absolute divide between persons and things.  
If persons own persons, we are back to the slave economy of the ancient past.  If things own 
persons, we are perhaps trapped in the world of a science-fiction. Capitalistic firms are founded on 
this simple relationship between persons and things.  In the case of the traditional sole-
proprietorship firm, a man of means invested his capital in productive assets in order to earn 
profits.  As is shown in Fig. 2, the individual capitalist was the subject of property right, whereas 
the assets, both tangible and intangible, were the objects of property right.  They were directly 
opposed as a person and things 
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Fig. 2: The Basic Structure of a Sole-Proprietorship Firm. 
  We can draw essentially the same picture for the partnership firm.  Instead of a single person 
owning assets, a group of persons now own these things jointly, as is depicted in Fig. 3.  And yet, 
a transition from sole-proprietorship to partnership may engender a fundamental change in the 
nature of the firm.    Partner
   Partner
   ŋŋŋŋŋŋŋ
   Partner
    Assets
  
Fig. 3: The Basic Structure of a Partnership Firm. 
   In capitalistic society, every business undertaking must enter into numerous contractual 
relations with outside parties such as employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, as is 
illustrated in Fig. 4.  In the case of a partnership firm, every partner has an equal right and an equal 
duty to any contract it maintains.  This means that whenever there is a withdrawal or a death of an 
old partner or an admission of a new partner, each contract has to be rewritten or at least the 
signatures of the partners have to be updated.  To rewrite a contract ex post involves various kinds 
of transaction costs.  Of course, if the number of partners is small or the scope of outside contracts 
is limited, it may be possible to save these transaction costs by including ex ante provisions for 
such contingencies in each contract.  But, as the size of the partnership gets larger or outside 
relationships become numerous, these transaction costs would soon become prohibitively large, 
thereby rendering the contracts necessarily incomplete.  Outside parties would then be easily 
discouraged to enter into contractual relations with the partnership firm. Contractual Relations
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   Partner







Fig. 4: Contractual Relations between a Partnership Firm and Outside Parties.  
   The corporation is a legal solution to this problem.  How can it solve this problem?  If a group 
of N investors decide to set up a corporation and to become its shareholders, it is like creating 
beside themselves the N+1
st
 person who has the same legal capacity to own real assets as they 
themselves have.  Outside parties then become able to enter into a contract with this N+1
st
 person, 
independently of its N shareholders, in exactly the same manner as they form a contract with the 
owner of a sole-proprietorship firm, as is illustrated in Fig. 5.  Hence, the complex network of 
contractual relations is greatly simplified, leading to a large reduction of transaction costs for all 
participants.  This also shields the contracting outside parties from the vagaries of the death, 
withdrawal or entry of its individual shareholders, thereby encouraging them to enter into 




   ŋŋŋŋŋŋŋ
 Shareholder
 Corporate Assets
      Suppliers
     Employees
     Customers
      Creditors
       Etc.
ɹ ɹ ɹ ɹCorporation
 Fig. 5: Corporation as a Legal Device to Simplify Outside Relations. 
  I have dwelled upon a textbook account of corporate raison d’être in order to bring home the 
central fact about the legal institution of corporation: the corporation cannot be reduced to a mere 
‘standard form contract’ among its constituting shareholders.  The corporation is presented here, 
not as a devise to economize on the transaction costs of arranging internal organization among 
shareholders, but as a devise to economize on the transaction costs of arranging external 
relationships the shareholders have to have with outside parties.  As the corporate nominalists 
have never been tired of pointing out, any innovation in the firm’s organizational structure can in 
principle be arranged internally by a well-crafted contractual agreement among shareholders.
7  To 
do so may incur transaction costs, but those costs could easily be reduced by the extensive use of 
standard form contracts.  In contrast, the corporation’s legal capacity to coordinate the complex 
contractual relations between inside shareholders and outside parties is essentially a ‘social’ or 
‘inter-subjective’ one.  It cannot be asserted by the internal agreement among shareholders alone, 
no matter how skillfully they formulate the contract, unless it is acknowledged by employers, 
suppliers, customers, creditors, and other outsiders.  An incorporated firm is able to act as an 
independent owner of its own property capable of forming contractual relations with others, not 
because the inside shareholders will it to be so, but because, and in so far as, the outside parties 
recognize it to be so.  Such social recognition is indispensable, and what the law does is to 
formalize and reinforce this social recognition in the form of legal personality.
8   
  We have thus seen that the corporation has been introduced into the legal system as a non-
contractual legal device that simplifies the external relations of a group of investors.  But we all 
know that there is no 'free lunch' -- even in the province of law.   What I would like to show now 
is that this simplifying device also has the effect of complicating the internal ownership structure 
of the corporate firm.            
  
2. The Corporation as a Person/Thing Duality. 
 
  Suppose you are an owner of a mom & pop grocery shop around a corner.  Whenever you feel 
hungry, you can pick up an apple on the shelf and eat it right away.  That apple is your property, 
and the only thing you have to worry about is the wrath of your spouse -- your co-owner.    
                                                 
7 See, for instance, Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), p. 1445, and Posner (1992), pp. 392-393.  
8 The Latin word ‘persona,’ from which the English word ‘person’ is derived, meant originally an actor’s 
mask.  Each persona incarnated a role in a drama, and the spectator recognized the role of each actor by the 
persona he wore.  It is not to express his inner self through it but to act out the role incarnated by it that an 
actor wore a persona on his face.   Suppose next you are a shareholder of a corporation, say, a big supermarket chain.  Suppose 
further that you feel hungry.  If you march into one of its stores and grab an apple from the shelf, 
claiming that that apple is your property.  What will happen to you?  You will be immediately 
arrested as a thief!  Why?  It is because corporate shareholders are not the owners of corporate 
assets.  Who is, then, the owner of the corporate assets?  The answer is, of course, the corporation 
itself as a ‘legal person.’  After all, the corporate assets are literally the corporation’s assets.   It is 
the corporation itself as a legal person that is the owner of the corporate assets.  Then, what are the 
corporate shareholders?   The answer is, of course, they are the owners of the corporation.  
Literally as well as legally, corporate shareholders are the holders of a corporate share – of a 
bundle of the financial rights and participatory rights in the corporation that can be bought and 
sold freely as an object of property right.  Indeed, to hold a corporate share is to own a fraction of 
the corporation as a ‘legal thing,’ independent of the remaining fraction and separate and distinct 
from the underlying corporate assets.  It is the corporation itself as a legal thing that the corporate 
shareholders are the owners of.  
  All this is the most elementary fact about the corporation no textbook of corporate law has ever 
failed to make note of.  But its implications, I believe, have not been fully worked out even by 
legal scholars, let alone by economists.  It is because this observation will lead us to the most 
crucial characterization of the internal structure of a corporate firm.  In contrast to a single-
ownership firm and a partnership firm, a corporate firm is composed of not one but two ownership 
relations --the shareholders own the corporation, and the corporation in turn owns the corporate 
assets.  This is illustrated in Fig. 6, which should be contrasted with Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 6: The Two-Tier Ownership Structure of a Corporate Firm. 
  I have argued in the preceding section that the corporation is a legal device that simplifies the 
external relations a business firm has to have with outsiders.  I have now shown that the same 
legal device has the effect of complicating the internal structure of a business firm by doubling the 
ownership relations within it.  In fact, in this two-tier ownership structure the corporation is 
playing the dual role, of a 'person' and of a 'thing'.  It owns assets and it is owned by shareholders.  
In other words, in regard to things, a corporation acts legally as a person, as a subject of property 
right; and in regard to persons, a corporation is acted on legally as a thing, as an object of property 
right.  Of course, a corporation is neither a person nor a thing in reality.  Legally, however, it is 
endowed with both personality and thingness. 
  It is my belief that it is not the personality per se but the person/thing duality of the corporation 
that is responsible for most of the confusion in the past controversy on corporate personality.  In 
fact, if we only look at the first tier, the corporation appears merely as a thing owned and 
controlled by shareholders, and we draw near to the position of corporate nominalists.  If we only 
look at the second tier, the corporation appears fully as a person owning and managing corporate assets, and we draw near to the position of corporate realists.   
  However, one must note that even within the province of law a corporation still falls short of 
being either a full person or a mere thing.  The fact that it can be owned by other persons makes it 
less than a person even legally, and the fact that it can own other things makes it more than a thing 
even legally.  But what I am going to demonstrate in the following two sections is that there are 
ways to eliminate either personality or thingness from the person/thing corporation, thereby 
turning it into a mere 'thing' or a full 'person', respectively.  
 
3. How to Make a 'Nominalistic' Corporation. 
 
  The way to eliminate the personality from a corporation is simple: it is to have someone own 
more than fifty percent of its shares.  That someone then acquires an absolute control over the 
corporation.  The corporation is deprived of its subjectivity and turned into a mere object of 
property right.  Legally speaking, the corporation is still the sole owner of the corporate assets, but 
in practice it is the dominant shareholder who can exercise the ultimate control over them.  As is 
illustrated in Fig. 7, the corporate firm is reduced de facto to a single ownership relation between 
the dominant shareholder and the productive assets.  We are certainly in the world of corporate 






Fig. 7: A ‘Nominalistic’ Corporation. 
  This is of course a common sense.  But I will now argue that the so-called corporate raiders are 
daily putting this legal mechanism into practice in the real economy.     That a corporate firm consists of two-tier ownership relations implies that it contains in it two 
kinds of 'things' — the corporate assets and the corporation itself.  This fact immediately implies 
that there are also two kinds of values residing in a corporate firm.  They are, respectively, the 
value of corporate assets and the value of the corporation itself as a thing.  The former can be 
defined as the present discounted value of the future profit stream that would accrue from the most 
efficient use of these assets.  This can also be called the 'fundamental' value of the corporation.  
The latter can be identified with the total share price of the corporation in the stock market.  And 
the business of a corporate raider is to search for a corporation whose stock market value is 
substantially lower than the value of the underlying assets.  As soon as he has identified such 
corporation, he begins a takeover bid (TOB).   
  Suppose that a TOB was successful, then our corporate raider would gain an absolute control 
over the use of the corporate assets.
9  He then closes off the corporation from the stock market.  If 
he wants quick money, then he as the de facto owner sells off part or all of the corporate assets in 
second-hand asset markets.  If he is patient, he replaces the incumbent managers by new and better 
ones, closely monitors their management, and wait for the upward turn of the performance of the 
purchased corporation.   Indeed, it is the difference between the values of corporate assets and 
corporate shares that constitutes the profit from this TOB operation. 
  We all know that money and hubris are what motivate our corporate raiders.  Whatever their 
subjective motives, their day-to-day business in effect consists of an attempt to realize the idea of 
corporate nominalism in this world. 
 
4. How to Make a 'Realistic' Corporation 
 
  I am now going to demonstrate that there exists a legal mechanism which is able to eliminate 
the thingness from the person-cum-thing corporation. 
  We know that as a legal person a corporation can own things, and that as a legal thing a 
corporation can be owned by persons.  This at once suggests us that a corporation as a person can 
in principle own another corporation as a thing.   In fact, since the state of New Jersey in the 
United States legalized holding corporations in 1889, corporations all over the world have been 
buying and holding the shares of other corporations.   A holding corporation is a corporation that 
is created solely for the purpose of owning other corporations, as is shown in Fig. 8.  It thus acts as 
                                                 
9 We ignore all the informational difficulties associated with TOB operation discussed by Grossman and 
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Fig. 8: A Holding Corporation and a Pyramidal Ownership Structure. 
  In fact, the holding corporation has opened a way to an important organizational 
innovation: the pyramidal system of ownership and control.  At the top is a natural person who 
owns a corporation as a thing.  But, being also a legal person, that corporation can own another 
corporation as a thing, which again as a legal person can own another corporation as a thing, and 
so on.  Such ownership hierarchy can extend ad infinitum.  This is, however, not the whole 
picture.  Because you do not have to own all the shares to control a publicly-held corporation.  As 
long as minority shares are sufficiently diffused among passive investors in the stock market, only 
a share slightly greater than 50% is sufficient for the control of the entire corporation.  This 
implies that one unit of capital can in principle control almost two units of capital, if each half 
buys a bare majority of the shares of a corporation with a capital close to one unit.  It then follows 
that, as more and more layers are added to the ownership hierarchy, a capitalist at the top can 
multiply the controlling power of his or her capital by the order close to 2n, where n is the number 
of hierarchical layers beneath.
10  One can regard the pre-war Japanese Zaibatsu and present-day 
                                                 
10 Moreover, if this hierarchical structure is combined with cross-shareholdings at each hierarchical layer, 
the capitalist at the top can further enhance the leverage of his or her own capital. Italian family empires and Korean chaebols as typical examples of this pyramidal system of 
ownership and control.
11  
  Nevertheless, a holding corporation still falls short of shedding its thingness entirely, because it 
has its own dominant shareholders watching over it.  One can, however, go a step further at least 
in theory.  A corporation as a person can own itself as a thing.  Indeed, nothing prevents us from 
imagining a corporation that becomes its own controlling shareholder by holding a majority block 
of its own shares under its own name, as is illustrated in Fig. 9.  If this were indeed possible, that 
corporation would be free from any control by real human beings and become a self-determining 
subject.  It would remove the thingness from itself and acquire a full personality at least in the 
province of law. 
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Fig. 9: A (Hypothetical) Self-Owning Corporation.  
  One might dismiss all this as idle speculation.  Many countries prohibit a corporation from 
repurchasing its own outstanding shares.   And in other countries which allow share repurchases, 
the repurchased shares always lose their voting rights in shareholders meetings.  (They are called 
‘treasury stocks’ because they are kept in the corporate treasury’s safety box during shareholders 
meetings.)   In the real economy, therefore, it appears impossible for the corporation to become its 
own owner.   
  There is, however, an important leeway to this.  Imagine a situation where two corporations, A 
and B, hold a majority of each other's shares.  As is illustrated in Fig. 10, the corporation A as a 
person owns the corporation B as a thing, and the corporation B as a person in turn owns the 
corporation A as a thing.   Even though each corporation does not own itself directly, it does 
indirectly through the intermediacy of the other corporation.   Though in a much more attenuated 
manner than in the case of single self-ownership, we have here a pair of corporations owning 
themselves and becoming free from the control of any human beings. 
                                                 
11 See Barca, Iwai, Pagano and Trento (1999).ç 
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Fig. 10: Mutually Holding Corporations. 
  
One might still object to the practical possibility of this leeway by pointing out that some countries 
impose legal limits on the extent of cross-shareholdings between corporations.  Equally important, 
many countries place ownership limits on the percentage of shares that banks and other financial 
institutions may own in an individual corporation.  For instance, Japanese law forbids a bank from 
owning more than 5 percent of the shares of any domestic corporation. 
Yet, it is possible to circumvent even these limits.  Suppose that twelve corporations get together 
and that each holds 5 percent of each of the other's shares.  Then, simple arithmetic ((12 - 1)× 5% = 
55% > 50%) tells us that a majority block of each corporation's shares could be effectively sealed 
off from real human beings, without violating any of the above-mentioned legal restrictions on 
cross-shareholding.  As is depicted in Fig. 11, these twelve corporations would indeed become 
their own owners at least as a group.   It is therefore practically impossible to prevent corporations 
from becoming their own owners, if they so wish. Natural
Persons
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   ççç ççç ççç çççFig. 11: Cross-Shareholdings Among 12 Corporations. 
  We have now reached the paradigm of corporate realism.  We have indeed seen that by 
extensive cross-shareholdings a group of corporations can get rid of their thingness and become 
self-determining subjects in the system of law.  
 
5. Indeterminacy Principle and Two Capitalisms.   
 
  I have thus elucidated two legal mechanisms – one turning a person-cum-thing corporation into 
a mere thing, and the other turning a person-cum-thing corporation into a full person.  
  What we have established is a sort of the indeterminacy principle in law, that law is incomplete 
and is unable to determine the nature of the corporation even within its own system.  Instead, the 
universal corporate law has unknowingly provided each society with a 'menu' of corporate 
structures from which it can choose.  Indeed, each society can choose any position along a long 
spectrum that runs from a purely 'nominalistic' to a purely 'realistic' structure, on the basis of or at 
least under the influence of economic efficiency, political interests, ideological forces, cultural 
traditions, historical evolution and other extra-legal factors. 
   That the law has really served as an effective ‘menu’ is evidenced by the well-known fact that 
even among advanced industrial societies the dominant corporate form varies widely from country 
to country -- America and Britain with very active M&A activities in stock markets standing the nearest to the ‘nominalistic’ pole, Japan and Germany with extensive cross-shareholdings among 




6. Corporate Managers as Fiduciaries of the Corporation. 
 
  Our picture of the corporate firm could never be complete without having ‘managers,’ i.e., 
directors and officers, painted explicitly in it.
13  Even if the corporation has a full-fledged 
personality in the system of law, it is in reality a mere abstract entity that is incapable of 
performing any act except through the act of flesh and blood human beings.  In fact, it is a legal 
requirement that the corporation must have a board of directors who hold the formal powers to act 
in the name of the corporation.  And it is a common practice that these directors delegate part of 
their formal power to corporate officers for the actual management of corporate assets.  This is 
once again an elementary fact in corporate law, but we have reiterated it so as to highlight a 
fundamental difference between managers in an incorporated firm and managers in an 
unincorporated firm.  The recent upsurge of the naïve form of corporate nominalism, under the 
new guise of the contractual theory of the firm, has blurred this difference completely and reduced 
the theory of 'corporate governance' to a mere application of the theory of agency.  This is a 
mistake.  
  ‘Agency’ is, according to its leading definition, ‘a fiduciary relation which results from the 
manifestation of consent by one person [the principal] to another [the agent] that the other shall act 
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.’
14  The control need not 
be total and continuous, but there must be some sense that the principal is ‘in charge.’
15  Needless 
to say, the relation between owners and managers in a partnership firm is a paradigmatic agency 
relation, with the owners being the principals and the managers their agents, as is illustrated in Fig. 
12.  It is the owners who unilaterally define the objective of the relationship and maintain the 
power to control and direct the managers who have consented to act solely on their behalf.  In fact, 
                                                 
12 See Prowse (1994) for an informative survey of corporate structures among large firms in the U.S., U.K., 
Japan and Germany.  
13 I use the term 'managers' to designate both directors and officers in the case of incorporated business 
firms.  I therefore ignore here the problems pertaining to the often difficult relationship between directors 
and officers.  
14 America Law Institute’s Restatement [Second] of Agency, sec. 1 [1]. 
15 ‘The agency cannot exist unless the “acting for” party (the agent) consents to the will of the “acted for” 
party (the principal).  The control need not be total or continuous and need not extend to the way the agent 
physically performs, but there must be some sense that the principal is “in charge.”  At minimum, the 
principal must have the right to control the goal of the relationship.’ Kleinberger (1995), p. 8. the owners need not hire any managers at all.  They can at any time terminate the agency relation 
and manage their own assets by themselves.  If there are any problems pertaining to the 
governance of a partnership firm, they all arise from asymmetric information between owners 
(principals) and managers (agents), in the form of adverse selection and/or moral hazard.  And the 
task of governing an unincorporated firm can be reduced to that of designing an incentive system 
that would minimize the inefficiency (agency cost) arising from such asymmetric information.
16  
Of course, this is all in the realm of contractual law, and little room is left for mandatory legal 
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Fig. 12: Managers as Agents in a Single-Proprietorship or Partnership Firm 
  Once, however, we turn to the problem of ‘corporate’ governance, or of governing the 
‘corporate’ form of business firm with its characteristic two-tier ownership structure, we find 
ourselves on a totally different plane.  The relation between shareholders and managers can no 
longer be identified with an agency relation.  To be sure, shareholders can fire individual directors 
or even replace the entire team of incumbent directors at the shareholder meeting.  But, they 
cannot dismiss the very legal institution of the board of directors, as long as a corporation remains 
a corporation.  To be sure, shareholders can approve or veto the managers’ major policy decisions 
at shareholders meetings.  But they cannot deny the very legal power of the managers to act in the 
name of corporation, as long as a corporation remains a corporation.
17  Shareholders are in no 
sense ‘in charge’ of the managers of their corporation.    
 
                                                 
16 See Jensen and Mechling (1976).  The recent survey on the theory of corporate governance along this 
line is Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
17 ‘Stockholders cannot withdraw the authority they delegated to the board of directors, because they never 
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Fig. 13: Corporate Managers as Fiduciaries of the Corporation. 
  Corporate managers are not the agents of the shareholders.  If so, what are they?  What are the 
legal status of the corporate managers?  The answer is: they are the “fiduciaries” of the 
corporation.  (See Fig. 13.)  The fiduciary is a person who is entrusted to act as a substitute for 
another person for the sole purpose of serving that person.
18  Examples include guardian, 
conservator, trustee, administrator, attorney, physician, psychiatrist, fund manager, etc.  A 
fiduciary is called an agent if he is bound by a contract (often implicit) with the beneficiary and is 
subject to her control.  But the agent is merely a special type of fiduciary, and many of the 
fiduciary relations are non-contractual.  Indeed, in the case of corporate directors it is the law that 
                                                 
18 According to Tamar Frankel (1983), the defining characteristics of fiduciary relations are: (a) that ‘the 
fiduciary serves as a substitute for the entrustor’ and (b) that ‘the fiduciary obtains powers from the 
entrustor or from a third party for the sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to act effectively.’ (pp. 808-9).  
See also Frankel (1995) and DeMott (1991).  endows them with the fiduciary powers to act in the name of the corporation.  
  This at once leads us to the central problem of corporate governance: the managers’ abuse of 
fiduciary powers.  The risk that the corporate managers may not use their fiduciary powers in the 
best interest of the corporation stems from the very nature of the corporation as a legal person.
19  
Since the corporation is a mere legal construct, its managers are the ones who actually decide 
whether to buy or sell, lend or mortgage, use or maintain the corporate assets, all in the name of 
the corporation.  Any act taken by the managers as managers legally binds the corporation as the 
act of the corporation itself.  Then, there inevitably emerges the danger of quid pro quo: the 
danger that the managers unconsciously mistake their fiduciary powers for their own powers 
which can be employed at their own discretion.  They may not exercise these powers with enough 
care and prudence that the best interest of the corporation would demand.  Worse, they may 
consciously appropriate these powers for the purposes of conferring a benefit on themselves, or 
even of injuring a particular party. 
 
7. Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Governance 
 
  How can we prevent corporate managers from abusing their fiduciary powers?  The answer to 
this question is by no means simple.  But, I would maintain that at the foundation of the corporate 
governance system lie the corporate managers’ ‘fiduciary duties’ to the corporation, and that the 
legal rules regulating these duties should be essentially mandatory.  These are no more than the 
orthodox principles of corporate governance before the onslaught of the contractual theory of the 
firm.
20  These orthodox principles are still honored among practical-minded corporate lawyers, but 
the current trend in legal thinking is certainly in the direction of eliminating any mandatory 
element from fiduciary law.
21  What I would like to do now is to present a ‘proof’ of the orthodox 
principles by means of what one might call a ‘legal thought-experiment.’  In fact, the model of the 
purely ‘realistic’ corporation delineated in Section 4 provides us with an ideal setting for that 
experiment. 
                                                 
19 ‘It is important to emphasize that the entrustor's vulnerability to abuse of power does not result from an 
initial inequality of bargaining power between the entrustor and the fiduciary. .....  Rather, the entrustor's 
vulnerability stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation.   The delegated power that 
enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor, because the purpose 
for which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is narrower than the purposes for which he is 
capable of using that power.’ Frankel (1983), p. 810. 
20 For a clear exposition of the orthodox principles, see Clark (1985); see also Clark (1986) pp. 114 -189 
and Eisenberg (1989). 
21 See Langbein (1995) as the representative of these recent attempts.     For this purpose, let us again imagine a corporation that is its own controlling shareholder by 
holding a majority block of its own shares.  To remove any impurities from this hypothetical self-
owning corporation, let us further suppose that it has no outstanding loans from banks and other 
financial institutions and that its relationships with workers, suppliers and customers are all at 
arm’s length.  Then, the only flesh and blood human beings we can find within the corporation are 
the directors and officers, that is, the managers. 
  What would be the principles of corporate governance for this hypothetical corporation?  There 
is only one answer: by fiduciary law.  Indeed, it is simply impossible to leave the matter to private 
ordering.  The corporation itself is unable to arrange a monitoring mechanism or a bonding 
scheme with the managers, except through the very managers it is supposed to discipline.  The 
corporation itself is unable to work out an incentive system (such as performance dependent 
bonuses and stock options) with the managers, except through the very managers it is supposed to 
give an incentive.  Any attempt to control the corporate managers by means of contractual 
arrangements, whether explicit or implicit, would necessarily degenerate into self-dealing by 
managers themselves, and create the very problem it is attempting to solve.  The only way to 
protect the interests of the corporation from such self-dealing is to have fiduciary law regulate 
directly the behaviors of managers. 
  The most conspicuous feature of the fiduciary law is its highly ‘moralistic’ tone.
 22  It imposes 
on the fiduciaries the ‘duties’ to perform once they have consented to act as fiduciaries.  The law 
lists many such duties, but the most fundamental ones are ‘the duty of loyalty’ and ‘the duty of 
care’.
23  The duty of loyalty obliges the corporate managers to control the assets of the corporation 
in the best interest of the corporation and not in conflict of interest.  It forbids them to self-deal 
with corporate assets, to trade corporate opportunity, and to trade on inside information; it imposes 
strict rules on the disclosure of information; it restrains managers from taking ‘excessive’ 
compensations.  The duty of care then demands the corporate managers to manage the corporate 
assets with reasonable skill and care. 
  It is the essence of fiduciary law that it imposes these duties, not as a mere rhetorical device, 
but as the real content of the law.  The advocates of the contractual theory of the firm, however, 
identify the fiduciary law with ‘a standard-form penalty clause in every agency contract’ and 
characterize it as the rules which ‘approximate the bargain that investors and agents would strike if 
they were able to dicker at no cost.’
24  They thus argue that the fiduciary duties specified in 
                                                 
22 See Frankel (1983), pp. 829-832; and Clark (1985), pp. 75-79. 
23 Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959), for instance, lists 17 (!) such duties in §§169 - 185.  
24 Easterbrook and Fischel (1982), p. 737. corporate law are essentially ‘enabling’ and can be and must be waived if the participants of what 
they call ‘the corporate contract’ believe they can strike a better bargain among themselves.  This 
is totally untenable.  Fiduciary law can never be a substitute for the private order.  It is placed and 
ought to be placed at the foundation of the corporate governance system for no other reason than 
that any attempt to control corporate managers by means of contract or other forms of voluntary 
agreement would necessarily involve an element of managerial self-dealing.  To make corporate 
law enabling and permit its fiduciary rules to be bargained around by insiders would be the surest 
way to destroy the corporate governance system.   
  It is fortunate that the entire tradition of fiduciary law has so far resisted to viewing the 
fiduciary rules as implicit contracts.  The courts hold corporate managers liable for a breach of the 
fiduciary duties, even if some of these duties are expressly removed by corporate statutes, charter 
and bylaws, or by terms in contracts.  They also refuse to delve into the subjective intentions of 
managers.  Once corporate managers choose to become corporate managers, they owe the 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and cannot waive the courts’ supervision at will. 
  One may take exception to this entire discussion, on the ground that it deals only with a 
hypothetical self-owning corporation without any stakeholders.  However, as long as the business 
firm takes the form of a corporation with its characteristic two-tier ownership structure, it must 
have managers as its fiduciaries, thereby structurally giving rise to the possibility of fiduciary 
abuse of powers.  Any attempt to control such abuse through contractual arrangement would 
necessarily involve an element of managerial self-dealing.  And this is independent of whether the 
corporation occupies a position close to the ‘realistic’ end or the ‘nominalistic’ end of the legal 
menu of corporate forms we discussed in Section 5.  It is in this sense that we claim that the 
corporate managers’ fiduciary duties to the corporation should lie ‘at the foundation’ of any 
corporate governance system. 
 
8. Comparative Corporate Governance 
 
  It is, however, neither wise nor practical to rely exclusively on the fiduciary law for the 
governance of corporate firms.  Implementation of such law requires a well-organized legal 
system in general and active courts in particular.  But not every country has a well-organized legal 
system, let alone active courts.  And even if the courts were active, the full implementation of 
fiduciary law would demand a large amount of human and non-human resources.  All the more so 
since the ‘business judgment rule’ very often works as a barrier to its applications unless courts are presented very strong cases. 
  For the efficient as well as effective governance of corporate firms, it is thus of vital importance 
to supplement the fiduciary law with other governance mechanisms.  And it is as the agents of 
these supplementary mechanisms that various stakeholders, such as banks, employees, suppliers, 
customers, and among others shareholders, find their roles to play in the system of corporate 
governance.  Indeed, there is a wide variation in costs and benefits of these supplementary 
mechanisms across countries, depending more or less on whether their dominant corporate form is 
‘realistic’ or ‘nominalistic’.  It is this variation that, I believe, should constitute the starting point 
of the theory of comparative corporate governance, if there is such a theory at all.
25 
  In order to develop a theory of comparative corporate governance, the only thing I have to do 
now is to add ‘impurities’ to our hypothetical self-owning corporation little by little and to see 
how they will open up room for supplementary governance mechanisms.  The following is a very 
brief sketch of such a theory.   
(1) Let us first note that in actual society a corporation can become ‘realistic’ only as the result of 
extensive cross-shareholdings with other corporations.  This implies that even the managers of a 
‘realistic’ corporation are not free from peer pressure.  If the managers of all the other corporations 
in the same group were to get together, they could muster enough shares to oust their fellow 
managers who have done disservice to the corporate group as a whole.
26 
(2)  Second, let us remove the supposition that our ‘realistic’ corporation has no outstanding loans.  
There then emerges the possibility of default, and on the brink of default the residual rights over 
corporate assets are effectively transferred to the creditors.
27  And once a corporation actually files 
for bankruptcy, the banks and other creditors, at least some of the major ones, are forced to 
assume an active role in monitoring the managers’ restructuring activities.  To be sure, such 
governance mechanism operates only in a state of emergency and ex post facto, but that possibility 
may legitimize the banks and creditors to acquire a de facto right to monitor the managerial 
performance ex ante as a sort of preventive measure.  As a matter of fact, commercial banks in 
Japan and in some of the continental European countries have (or used to have) long-term 
                                                 
25 For some useful accounts of comparative corporate governance, see, for instance, Mayer (1988), Aoki 
(1988), Franks and Mayer (1990), Coffee (1991), Baums (1992), Aoki and Dore (1994), Roe (1994), and 
Prowse (1994). 
26 The so-called Mitsukoshi affair in Japan may be regarded as a good example of this mechanism.  An 
autocratic and scandal-prone president of Mitsukoshi Department Store, a member corporation of the 
Mitsui group, was ousted in a board meeting at the initiative of an influential director who was a former 
president of the Mitsui Bank (hence, external to the corporation but internal to the group as a whole) so as 
to save the reputation of the Mitsui group as a whole.  
27  Because of the limited liability of shareholders, when the value of corporate assets cannot cover the 
value of debts, the rights over the disposal of the assets shift entirely to the hands of the creditors.  relationship with their client corporations and closely monitor their short-term financial positions 
and long-term investment plans.  If they hold a substantial equity position as well, they may use 
that power to directly intervene in managerial decision-making and even go so far as to dispatch a 
rescue team when their client corporation is in financial distress.  Indeed, there are several 
empirical studies, as well as a number of anecdotal stories, that suggest that such governance 
system in Japan and in Germany have been effective in mitigating moral hazard problems of the 
client corporation, especially when it is in financial distress.
28  In recent years, however, the 
government-led deregulation of financial markets and the market-driven wave of financial 
innovations are said to have weakened much of the efficacy of such system. 
(3) Let us then introduce long-term employees into our picture of the ‘realistic’ corporation.  In 
several European countries employees have legal rights to participate in corporate management.
29  
For instance, German law requires a stock corporation (AG) of more than 2,000 employees to 
have the representatives of employees and trade unions occupy 50% of seats on the supervisory 
board which oversees the lower-tier management board.
30  No such law exists in Japan; but a 
majority and sometimes the entire membership of the board of directors and the board of 
inspectors of a large Japanese corporation are promoted from the pool of core employees who 
enjoy long-term employment, a seniority wage system and company unionism.  Behind these laws 
and practices is a fact that the long-term employees have accumulated throughout their long 
working careers in the same organization a large amount of organizational assets -- skills and 
know-how not easily transferable to outside uses.  If such skills and know-how were to contribute 
to the profitability of the corporation, the employees embodying them in their corporeal existence 
should have a de facto right to the management of the corporation. 
(4) We now let our ‘realistic’ corporation maintain relational contracts with suppliers and 
customers.  On the one hand, repeated interactions may promote cooperation from suppliers and 
customers, which may work to lessen competitive pressures on managers.  On the other hand, 
long-lasting relationships may encourage suppliers and customers to voice their opinions openly 
on the matters related to their transactions, which may work to check some of the managerial 
decision-makings.  The balance can go either way, and nothing definite can be said on the 
effectiveness of this governance mechanism.   
(5)   It is time to leave the ‘realistic’ corporation and move in the ‘nominalistic’ direction along the 
                                                 
28 For the Japanese main bank system, see, for instance, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); for the 
German financial system, see Cable (1985). 
29  See, for instance, Hopt (1984). 
30  See, for instance, Blackburn (1993). long legal menu of possible corporate structures.  For this purpose, we now have to unwind the 
tight network of cross-shareholdings among group corporations and expose the managers of each 
one of them to the harshness of the stock market, that is, to the market for corporate control.  
  Hostile takeovers are often regarded as the most effective disciplinary device against managers.  
The basic argument is that whenever the share price of any corporation fails to reach the 
fundamental value of corporate assets, and as long as a majority of its shares are openly traded in 
the stock market, corporate raiders can easily employ the technique of LBO to wrest control from 
managers.  Fearful of such takeover, incumbent managers have little choice but to maximize the 
share price of their corporation.  The bulk of empirical evidence indeed suggests that hostile 
takeovers generate substantial gains to the targeted shareholders.
31  There are, however, heated 
disputes over the sources of these gains.  The standard theory has attributed these gains to the 
increased efficiency of the raided corporation, due to such factors as the installment of better 
managers, realization of economies of scale and scope, improvement of incentive schemes, and 
tapping of free cash flow.
32  In opposition to this, however, many argue that most of the gains of 
shareholders in hostile takeovers are no more than wealth transfers from other stakeholders.  The 
raiders may simply be expropriating long-term employees by effectively nullifying the implicit 
contracts they formed with ousted managers and forcing a substantial cut in their wages and 
pension funds
33; the raiders may simply be expropriating future shareholders and future 
stakeholders by slashing R&D and other future-orientated investments to finance current dividend 
payments
34; the raiders may simply be expropriating themselves by setting a bidding price much 
higher than is justified by the rational calculation of the fundamental value of corporate assets.
35 
(6)   Finally, let us go to the other pole of the legal menu of corporate structures and examine the 
problems of governing a purely ‘nominalistic’ corporation.  By definition a purely ‘nominalistic’ 
corporation has a natural person (or a group of natural persons) who holds a majority block of its 
shares and effectively owns it as her property.  Such a corporation is of course the closest to the 
unincorporated business firm among all possible forms of corporations.  And yet, I would now 
argue that even in this case it does not mark the end of corporate governance problems; it merely 
changes the form they take.   
  The most important governance problem for the purely ‘nominalistic’ corporation is no longer 
                                                 
31 See Jensen and Richard Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), and Bhagat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990). 
32 Jensen (1988) p. 23. 
33 Shleifer and Summers (1988). 
34 Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1996). 
35 Roll(1986). the corporate managers’ abuse of fiduciary powers; it is now the dominant shareholder’s abuse of 
corporate privileges, especially of their limited liability status, to the detriment of outside 
creditors, such as lenders, suppliers, employees, customers, and tort plaintiffs.  A purely 
‘nominalistic’ corporation is in reality a mere thing at the disposal of its dominant shareholder.  
Yet, legally, or rather nominally, it still has a personality, distinct from that of the dominant 
shareholder and capable of owning assets under its own name.  And it is this real/nominal 
discrepancy that gives the dominant shareholder an easy opportunity for a variety of sham 
transactions.  In particular, she can use her own corporation as her ‘alter ego’ and have its 
managers transfer its assets and incomes to herself, with the intent to delay or reduce or defraud 
the payment of the debts it owes to outside creditors.  Indeed, it is to protect these unfortunate 
creditors from such fraudulent transfers that courts sometimes ‘pierce the corporate veil’ and 
subject the dominant shareholder to personal liability for the debts of the corporation.  Since these 
corporate piercing cases are the very product of the two-tier ownership structure that distinguishes 
incorporated business firms from unincorporated ones, I have included them in the category of 
‘corporate’ governance problems. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
  The title of this paper is “what is corporation?” and not “what is corporate firm?”  I have 
devoted the entire paper to the stipulation of the legal structure of the corporate firm.  A corporate 
firm is, however, not merely a legal entity but also an organizational entity that pools human 
skills, physical facilities and financial instruments in order to produce goods and services to 
markets.  Then, a question arises immediately.  What is the relationship between the corporation 
as a legal institution and the corporate organization as an economic institution?  
  In organization theory there are two competing views of organization -- one viewing 
organizations as collectivities rationally constructed to attain exogenously given purposes and the 
other viewing organizations as collectivities autonomously striving to reproduce themselves as 
going concerns.
36  My suggestion here is not an unexpected one.  There is a strong correlation 
between these opposing views of organizations and our 'nominalistic'/'realistic' dichotomy of 
corporate structures.  When we lift a legal veil from a nominalistic corporation, what we find as its 
social substratum is a group of shareholders who control the managers for the sole purpose of 
maximizing their own returns.  On the other hand, when we lift a legal veil of a realistic 
                                                 
36 See, for instance, Scott (1998) for a useful survey of the organizational theory. corporation, what we find as its social substratum is an autonomous organization whose internal 
members share a common interest in the survival and growth of the organization itself. 
  Moreover, I would also like to suggest that the autonomous character of the 'realistic' corporate 
organization is tied closely to the existence of intangible assets that have been variously called 
"firm-specific human assets," "organizational capabilities," "core competences," "managerial 
resources," etc.  They more or less refer to ‘the collective learning in the organization, especially 
how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology.’
37  In 
fact, these intangible assets have a very peculiar property -- they belong to nobody but the 
corporation!  No one outside of the corporate organization, by which I include not only creditors 
but also shareholders, can own these assets as their properties.  For these assets are inalienable 
human capabilities that are embodied in the members of the organization in the form of know-how 
and skills.  No one inside of the corporate organization, by which I mean managers and core 
workers, can appropriate them as their own properties either.  For these assets are organization-
specific and lose their economic values once those embodying them leave the organization.  Here 
emerges a key insight into the role the corporation as a legal institution has played in the historical 
development of capitalistic economies -- that the legal personality of corporation has been able to 
act as the de facto owner of these intangible assets, thereby encouraging their accumulation within 
corporate organizations.  Indeed, as has been documented so painstakingly by Alfred Chandler and 
other business historians, it is the development and maintenance of these assets, especially that of 
organizational capabilities of managers, that enabled modern business corporations to grow and 
continue to grow since the end of the 19
th century.
38  
  I, however, leave the fuller discussions on this topic to another occasion.   
                                                 
37 Prahalad and Hammel (1990), p. 82. 
38 Chandler (1977, 1990).  
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